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Majjhima Nikāya 74

Dīghanakhasutta

With Dīghanakha · Translation: Bhikkhu Sujato, SuttaCentral

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Evaṁ me sutaṁ—
ekaṁ samayaṁ bhagavā rājagahe viharati gijjhakūṭe pabbate sūkarakhatāyaṁ.

So I have heard. At one time the Buddha was staying near Rājagaha, on the Vulture’s Peak Mountain in the Boar’s Cave.

Atha kho dīghanakho paribbājako yena bhagavā tenupasaṅkami; upasaṅkamitvā bhagavatā saddhiṁ sammodi.
Sammodanīyaṁ kathaṁ sāraṇīyaṁ vītisāretvā ekamantaṁ aṭṭhāsi. Ekamantaṁ ṭhito kho dīghanakho paribbājako bhagavantaṁ etadavoca:
“ahañhi, bho gotama, evaṁvādī evaṁdiṭṭhi:
‘sabbaṁ me nakkhamatī’”ti.
“Yāpi kho te esā, aggivessana, diṭṭhi:
‘sabbaṁ me nakkhamatī’ti, esāpi te diṭṭhi nakkhamatī”ti?
“Esā ce me, bho gotama, diṭṭhi khameyya, taṁpassa tādisameva, taṁpassa tādisamevā”ti.

Then the wanderer Dīghanakha went up to the Buddha, and exchanged greetings with him. When the greetings and polite conversation were over, he stood to one side and said to the Buddha, “Worthy Gotama, this is my doctrine and view: ‘Nothing is acceptable to me.’” “This view of yours, Aggivessana— is that acceptable to you?” “If I were to accept this view, worthy Gotama, it would make no difference, it would make no difference!”

“Ato kho te, aggivessana, bahū hi bahutarā lokasmiṁ ye evamāhaṁsu:
‘taṁpassa tādisameva, taṁpassa tādisamevā’ti.
Te tañceva diṭṭhiṁ nappajahanti aññañca diṭṭhiṁ upādiyanti.
Ato kho te, aggivessana, tanū hi tanutarā lokasmiṁ ye evamāhaṁsu:
‘taṁpassa tādisameva, taṁpassa tādisamevā’ti.
Te tañceva diṭṭhiṁ pajahanti aññañca diṭṭhiṁ na upādiyanti.

“Well, Aggivessana, there are many more in the world who say, ‘It would make no difference! It would make no difference!’ But they don’t give up that view, and they grasp another view. And there are a scant few in the world who say, ‘It would make no difference! It would make no difference!’ And they give up that view by not grasping another view.

Santaggivessana, eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṁvādino evaṁdiṭṭhino:
‘sabbaṁ me khamatī’ti;
santaggivessana, eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṁvādino evaṁdiṭṭhino:
‘sabbaṁ me nakkhamatī’ti;
santaggivessana, eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṁvādino evaṁdiṭṭhino:
‘ekaccaṁ me khamati, ekaccaṁ me nakkhamatī’ti.
Tatraggivessana, ye te samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṁvādino evaṁdiṭṭhino: ‘sabbaṁ me khamatī’ti
tesamayaṁ diṭṭhi sārāgāya santike, saññogāya santike, abhinandanāya santike, ajjhosānāya santike, upādānāya santike;
tatraggivessana ye te samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṁvādino evaṁdiṭṭhino: ‘sabbaṁ me nakkhamatī’ti
tesamayaṁ diṭṭhi asārāgāya santike, asaññogāya santike, anabhinandanāya santike, anajjhosānāya santike, anupādānāya santike”ti.

There are some ascetics and brahmins who have this doctrine and view: ‘Everything is acceptable to me.’ There are some ascetics and brahmins who have this doctrine and view: ‘Nothing is acceptable to me.’ There are some ascetics and brahmins who have this doctrine and view: ‘Some things are acceptable to me and some things are not.’ Regarding this, the view of the ascetics and brahmins to whom everything is acceptable is close to greed, bondage, approving, attachment, and grasping. The view of the ascetics and brahmins to whom nothing is acceptable is far from greed, bondage, approving, attachment, and grasping.”

Evaṁ vutte, dīghanakho paribbājako bhagavantaṁ etadavoca:
“ukkaṁseti me bhavaṁ gotamo diṭṭhigataṁ, samukkaṁseti me bhavaṁ gotamo diṭṭhigatan”ti.
“Tatraggivessana, ye te samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṁvādino evaṁdiṭṭhino:
‘ekaccaṁ me khamati, ekaccaṁ me nakkhamatī’ti.
Yā hi tesaṁ khamati sāyaṁ diṭṭhi sārāgāya santike, saññogāya santike, abhinandanāya santike, ajjhosānāya santike, upādānāya santike;
yā hi tesaṁ nakkhamati sāyaṁ diṭṭhi asārāgāya santike, asaññogāya santike, anabhinandanāya santike, anajjhosānāya santike, anupādānāya santike.

When he said this, the wanderer Dīghanakha said to the Buddha, “Worthy Gotama commends my conviction! He recommends my conviction!” “Now, regarding the ascetics and brahmins to whom some things are acceptable and some things are not. Their view of what is acceptable is close to greed, bondage, approving, attachment, and grasping. Their view of what is not acceptable is far from greed, bondage, approving, attachment, and grasping.

Tatraggivessana, ye te samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṁvādino evaṁdiṭṭhino:
‘sabbaṁ me khamatī’ti
tattha viññū puriso iti paṭisañcikkhati:
‘yā kho me ayaṁ diṭṭhi—
sabbaṁ me khamatīti,
imañce ahaṁ diṭṭhiṁ thāmasā parāmāsā abhinivissa vohareyyaṁ—
idameva saccaṁ moghamaññanti;
dvīhi me assa viggaho—
yo cāyaṁ samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā evaṁvādī evaṁdiṭṭhi—sabbaṁ me nakkhamatīti,
yo cāyaṁ samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā evaṁvādī evaṁdiṭṭhi—ekaccaṁ me khamati, ekaccaṁ me nakkhamatīti—
imehi assa dvīhi viggaho.
Iti viggahe sati vivādo, vivāde sati vighāto, vighāte sati vihesā’.
Iti so viggahañca vivādañca vighātañca vihesañca attani sampassamāno tañceva diṭṭhiṁ pajahati aññañca diṭṭhiṁ na upādiyati.
Evametāsaṁ diṭṭhīnaṁ pahānaṁ hoti, evametāsaṁ diṭṭhīnaṁ paṭinissaggo hoti.

When it comes to the view of the ascetics and brahmins to whom everything is acceptable, a sensible person reflects like this: ‘I have the view that everything is acceptable. Suppose I were to obstinately stick to this view and insist, “This is the only truth, anything else is futile.” Then I’d argue with two individuals— an ascetic or brahmin to whom nothing is acceptable, and an ascetic or brahmin to whom some things are acceptable and some things are not. And when there’s arguing, there’s dispute; when there’s dispute there’s distress; and when there’s distress there’s harm.’ So, considering in themselves the potential for argument, dispute, distress, and harm, they give up that view by not grasping another view. That’s how those views are given up and let go.

Tatraggivessana, ye te samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṁvādino evaṁdiṭṭhino:
‘sabbaṁ me nakkhamatī’ti
tattha viññū puriso iti paṭisañcikkhati:
‘yā kho me ayaṁ diṭṭhi—
sabbaṁ me nakkhamatīti,
imañce ahaṁ diṭṭhiṁ thāmasā parāmāsā abhinivissa vohareyyaṁ—
idameva saccaṁ moghamaññanti;
dvīhi me assa viggaho—
yo cāyaṁ samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā evaṁvādī evaṁdiṭṭhi—sabbaṁ me khamatīti,
yo cāyaṁ samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā evaṁvādī evaṁdiṭṭhi—ekaccaṁ me khamati ekaccaṁ me nakkhamatīti—
imehi assa dvīhi viggaho.
Iti viggahe sati vivādo, vivāde sati vighāto, vighāte sati vihesā’.
Iti so viggahañca vivādañca vighātañca vihesañca attani sampassamāno tañceva diṭṭhiṁ pajahati aññañca diṭṭhiṁ na upādiyati.
Evametāsaṁ diṭṭhīnaṁ pahānaṁ hoti, evametāsaṁ diṭṭhīnaṁ paṭinissaggo hoti.

When it comes to the view of the ascetics and brahmins to whom nothing is acceptable, a sensible person reflects like this: ‘I have the view that nothing is acceptable. Suppose I were to obstinately stick to this view and insist, “This is the only truth, anything else is futile.” Then I’d argue with two individuals— an ascetic or brahmin to whom everything is acceptable, and an ascetic or brahmin to whom some things are acceptable and some things are not. And when there’s arguing, there’s dispute; when there’s dispute there’s distress; and when there’s distress there’s harm.’ So, considering in themselves the potential for argument, dispute, distress, and harm, they give up that view by not grasping another view. That’s how those views are given up and let go.

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