Dīghanakhasutta

Majjhima Nikāya 74

With Dīghanakha · Translation: Bhikkhu Sujato, SuttaCentral

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thusEvaṁ by meme heardsutaṁ—
oneekaṁ timesamayaṁ the Blessed Onebhagavā near Rājagaharājagahe is stayingviharati on Vulture's Peakgijjhakūṭe on the mountainpabbate in the Boar's Cavesūkarakhatāyaṁ.

So I have heard. At one time the Buddha was staying near Rājagaha, on the Vulture’s Peak Mountain in the Boar’s Cave.

thenAtha indeedkho Dīghanakhadīghanakho wandererparibbājako whereyena the Blessed Onebhagavā went up to himtenupasaṅkami; having approachedupasaṅkamitvā with the Blessed Onebhagavatā togethersaddhiṁ exchanged greetingssammodi.
greetingSammodanīyaṁ talkkathaṁ courteoussāraṇīyaṁ having concludedvītisāretvā to one sideekamantaṁ stoodaṭṭhāsi. to one sideEkamantaṁ standingṭhito indeedkho Dīghanakhadīghanakho wandererparibbājako to the Blessed Onebhagavantaṁ said thisetadavoca:
I indeed“ahañhi, worthybho Gotamagotama, one of such doctrineevaṁvādī one of such viewevaṁdiṭṭhi:
all‘sabbaṁ to meme is not acceptablenakkhamatī’”ti.
that which“Yāpi indeedkho of yourste thisesā, Aggivessanaaggivessana, viewdiṭṭhi:
all‘sabbaṁ to meme is not acceptablenakkhamatī’ti, this veryesāpi of yourste viewdiṭṭhi is not acceptablenakkhamatī”ti?
this“Esā ifce to meme, worthybho Gotamagotama, viewdiṭṭhi were acceptablekhameyya, it would betaṁpassa the very sametādisameva, it would betaṁpassa the very sametādisamevā”ti.

Then the wanderer Dīghanakha went up to the Buddha, and exchanged greetings with him. When the greetings and polite conversation were over, he stood to one side and said to the Buddha, “Worthy Gotama, this is my doctrine and view: ‘Nothing is acceptable to me.’” “This view of yours, Aggivessana— is that acceptable to you?” “If I were to accept this view, worthy Gotama, it would make no difference, it would make no difference!”

well“Ato indeedkho to youte, Aggivessanaaggivessana, manybahū indeedhi morebahutarā in the worldlokasmiṁ whoye they said thusevamāhaṁsu:
it would make no difference‘taṁpassa just the sametādisameva, it would make no differencetaṁpassa just the sametādisamevā’ti.
theyTe that very viewtañceva viewdiṭṭhiṁ they do not give upnappajahanti another tooaññañca viewdiṭṭhiṁ they graspupādiyanti.
wellAto indeedkho to youte, Aggivessanaaggivessana, fewtanū indeedhi fewertanutarā in the worldlokasmiṁ whoye they said thusevamāhaṁsu:
it would make no difference‘taṁpassa just the sametādisameva, it would make no differencetaṁpassa just the sametādisamevā’ti.
theyTe that very viewtañceva viewdiṭṭhiṁ they give uppajahanti another tooaññañca viewdiṭṭhiṁ notna they graspupādiyanti.

“Well, Aggivessana, there are many more in the world who say, ‘It would make no difference! It would make no difference!’ But they don’t give up that view, and they grasp another view. And there are a scant few in the world who say, ‘It would make no difference! It would make no difference!’ And they give up that view by not grasping another view.

There are some ascetics and brahmins who have this doctrine and view: ‘Everything is acceptable to me.’ There are some ascetics and brahmins who have this doctrine and view: ‘Nothing is acceptable to me.’ There are some ascetics and brahmins who have this doctrine and view: ‘Some things are acceptable to me and some things are not.’ Regarding this, the view of the ascetics and brahmins to whom everything is acceptable is close to greed, bondage, approving, attachment, and grasping. The view of the ascetics and brahmins to whom nothing is acceptable is far from greed, bondage, approving, attachment, and grasping.”

thusEvaṁ when saidvutte, Dīghanakhadīghanakho wandererparibbājako the Buddhabhagavantaṁ said thisetadavoca:
commends“ukkaṁseti myme worthybhavaṁ Gotamagotamo convictiondiṭṭhigataṁ, recommendssamukkaṁseti myme worthybhavaṁ Gotamagotamo convictiondiṭṭhigatan”ti.
now, Aggivessana,“Tatraggivessana, whoye thosete ascetics and brahminssamaṇabrāhmaṇā holding such doctrineevaṁvādino holding such viewevaṁdiṭṭhino:
some‘ekaccaṁ to meme is acceptablekhamati, someekaccaṁ to meme is not acceptablenakkhamatī’ti.
whichYā indeedhi of themtesaṁ is acceptablekhamati thissāyaṁ viewdiṭṭhi to greedsārāgāya is closesantike, to bondagesaññogāya is closesantike, to approvingabhinandanāya is closesantike, to attachmentajjhosānāya is closesantike, to graspingupādānāya is closesantike;
whichyā indeedhi of themtesaṁ is not acceptablenakkhamati thissāyaṁ viewdiṭṭhi from greedasārāgāya is farsantike, from bondageasaññogāya is farsantike, from approvinganabhinandanāya is farsantike, from attachmentanajjhosānāya is farsantike, from graspinganupādānāya is farsantike.

When he said this, the wanderer Dīghanakha said to the Buddha, “Worthy Gotama commends my conviction! He recommends my conviction!” “Now, regarding the ascetics and brahmins to whom some things are acceptable and some things are not. Their view of what is acceptable is close to greed, bondage, approving, attachment, and grasping. Their view of what is not acceptable is far from greed, bondage, approving, attachment, and grasping.

there, Aggivessana,Tatraggivessana, whoye thosete ascetics and brahminssamaṇabrāhmaṇā holding such a doctrineevaṁvādino holding such a view:evaṁdiṭṭhino:
“everything‘sabbaṁ to meme is acceptable”khamatī’ti
heretattha a sensibleviññū personpuriso thusiti reflects:paṭisañcikkhati:
“whatever‘yā indeedkho myme thisayaṁ view—diṭṭhi—
everythingsabbaṁ to meme is acceptable,”khamatīti,
if thisimañce Iahaṁ viewdiṭṭhiṁ obstinatelythāmasā graspingparāmāsā having insistedabhinivissa were to declare—vohareyyaṁ—
this aloneidameva truthsaccaṁ anything else is futile;moghamaññanti;
with twodvīhi myme there would beassa argument—viggaho—
whoyo and thiscāyaṁ asceticsamaṇo orvā brahminbrāhmaṇo orvā holding such a doctrineevaṁvādī holding such a view—nothingevaṁdiṭṭhi—sabbaṁ to meme is acceptable,”nakkhamatīti,
whoyo and thiscāyaṁ asceticsamaṇo orvā brahminbrāhmaṇo orvā holding such a doctrineevaṁvādī holding such a view—someevaṁdiṭṭhi—ekaccaṁ to meme is acceptable,khamati, someekaccaṁ to meme is not acceptable”—nakkhamatīti—
with theseimehi there would beassa twodvīhi arguments.viggaho.
ThusIti when there is argumentviggahe there issati dispute,vivādo, when there is disputevivāde there issati distress,vighāto, when there is distressvighāte there issati harm.”vihesā’.
ThusIti heso and argumentviggahañca and disputevivādañca and distressvighātañca and harmvihesañca in himselfattani consideringsampassamāno that verytañceva viewdiṭṭhiṁ he gives uppajahati and anotheraññañca viewdiṭṭhiṁ notna he grasps.upādiyati.
Thus of theseEvametāsaṁ viewsdiṭṭhīnaṁ the giving uppahānaṁ there is,hoti, thus of theseevametāsaṁ viewsdiṭṭhīnaṁ the letting gopaṭinissaggo there is.hoti.

When it comes to the view of the ascetics and brahmins to whom everything is acceptable, a sensible person reflects like this: ‘I have the view that everything is acceptable. Suppose I were to obstinately stick to this view and insist, “This is the only truth, anything else is futile.” Then I’d argue with two individuals— an ascetic or brahmin to whom nothing is acceptable, and an ascetic or brahmin to whom some things are acceptable and some things are not. And when there’s arguing, there’s dispute; when there’s dispute there’s distress; and when there’s distress there’s harm.’ So, considering in themselves the potential for argument, dispute, distress, and harm, they give up that view by not grasping another view. That’s how those views are given up and let go.

There, Aggivessana,Tatraggivessana, thoseye whote ascetics and brahminssamaṇabrāhmaṇā holding such a doctrineevaṁvādino holding such a view:evaṁdiṭṭhino:
‘nothing‘sabbaṁ to meme is not acceptable’nakkhamatī’ti
theretattha a sensibleviññū personpuriso thusiti reflects:paṭisañcikkhati:
‘this‘yā indeedkho of mineme thisayaṁ view—diṭṭhi—
nothingsabbaṁ to meme is not acceptable,nakkhamatīti,
if thisimañce Iahaṁ viewdiṭṭhiṁ obstinatelythāmasā graspingparāmāsā insistingabhinivissa were to declare—vohareyyaṁ—
this aloneidameva the truthsaccaṁ anything else is futile;moghamaññanti;
with twodvīhi of mineme there would beassa argument—viggaho—
oneyo and thiscāyaṁ asceticsamaṇo orvā brahminbrāhmaṇo orvā holding such a doctrineevaṁvādī holding such a view—everythingevaṁdiṭṭhi—sabbaṁ to meme is acceptable,khamatīti,
oneyo and thiscāyaṁ asceticsamaṇo orvā brahminbrāhmaṇo orvā holding such a doctrineevaṁvādī holding such a view—someevaṁdiṭṭhi—ekaccaṁ to meme is acceptablekhamati someekaccaṁ to meme is not acceptable—nakkhamatīti—
with theseimehi there would beassa twodvīhi arguments.viggaho.
Thus,Iti when there is argumentviggahe there beingsati dispute,vivādo, when there is disputevivāde there beingsati distress,vighāto, when there is distressvighāte there beingsati harm’.vihesā’.
ThusIti heso argument andviggahañca dispute andvivādañca distress andvighātañca harm andvihesañca in himselfattani consideringsampassamāno that verytañceva viewdiṭṭhiṁ gives uppajahati another andaññañca viewdiṭṭhiṁ notna grasps.upādiyati.
Thus of theseEvametāsaṁ of viewsdiṭṭhīnaṁ giving uppahānaṁ there is,hoti, thus of theseevametāsaṁ of viewsdiṭṭhīnaṁ letting gopaṭinissaggo there is.hoti.

When it comes to the view of the ascetics and brahmins to whom nothing is acceptable, a sensible person reflects like this: ‘I have the view that nothing is acceptable. Suppose I were to obstinately stick to this view and insist, “This is the only truth, anything else is futile.” Then I’d argue with two individuals— an ascetic or brahmin to whom everything is acceptable, and an ascetic or brahmin to whom some things are acceptable and some things are not. And when there’s arguing, there’s dispute; when there’s dispute there’s distress; and when there’s distress there’s harm.’ So, considering in themselves the potential for argument, dispute, distress, and harm, they give up that view by not grasping another view. That’s how those views are given up and let go.

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